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Abstract: The argument from design stands as one of the most intuitively compelling 
arguments for the existence of a divine creator.  Yet, for many scientists and 
philosophers, Hume’s critique and Darwin’s theory of natural selection have 
definitely undermined the idea that we can draw any analogy from design in artifacts 
to design in nature.  Here, we examine empirical studies from developmental and 
experimental psychology to investigate the cognitive basis of the design argument.  
From this it becomes clear that humans spontaneously discern purpose in nature.  
When constructed theologically and philosophically correctly, the design argument is 
not presented as conclusive evidence for God’s existence, but rather as an abductive, 
probabilistic argument.  We examine the cognitive basis of probabilistic judgments in 
relationship to natural theology.  Placing emphasis on how people assess improbable 
events, we clarify the intuitive appeal of Paley’s watch analogy.  We conclude that the 
reason why some scientists find the design argument compelling and others do not 
lies not in any intrinsic differences in assessing design in nature, but rather in the prior 
probability they place on complexity being produced by chance events or by a 
Creator.  This difference provides atheists and theists with a rational basis for 
disagreement.  
 
1 Introduction 
For many scientists and philosophers, Hume’s critique (1779) and Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection (1859) have definitely undermined the idea that we can draw any 
analogy from design in artifacts to design in nature.  Yet the argument from design 
remains one of the most popular arguments for God’s existence.  It enjoys an 
enduring appeal, going back as early as Plato’s Timaeus, Cicero’s De Natura Deorum 
and Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae.  Although it garnered particular attention around 
the turn of the 19th century, with Paley ([1802]2006) as the best-known example, 
recent formulations can be found in the work of Swinburne (e.g., 1968), Plantinga 
(e.g., 1991) and proponents of Intelligent Design.  Some (e.g., Wattles 2006) have 
argued that the appeal of the design argument can be explained by Aristotle’s 
pervasive influence on Western philosophy and theology in his concept of nature as 
inherently purposive.  Although cultural factors undeniably played an important role, 
we propose that the popularity of the design argument runs deeper, and that its 
argumentative structure can be traced back to evolved properties of the human mind.  
Recent discussions of the design argument in philosophy and theology (e.g., 
Robertson 2007, letter 6) have paid relatively little attention to the psychological 
underpinnings that lead to the understanding, acceptance or rejection of this argument. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the cognitive basis of the design argument, 
drawing on empirical studies from developmental and experimental psychology.  We 
focus on two aspects: the tendency of humans to discern teleology in nature, and the 
way they intuitively assess probabilities.  A better understanding of these aspects not 
only elucidates the lasting popularity of the design argument, but can also help theists 
and atheists to construct a rational basis for disagreement.  We begin by outlining an 
analysis of the epistemic properties of the design argument.  Next, we examine the 
cognitive basis of teleological reasoning and the design stance in children and adults. 
We then discuss the probabilistic aspects of the design argument.  Finally, we explore 
why theists and atheists disagree on the plausibility of the argument. 
 
2 The argument from design 
The argument for the existence of a divine creator, based on evidence of 
design in nature, has recently enjoyed a revival in theology and philosophy.  
Biologists (e.g., Dawkins [1986] 1991, 4-5) praise the argument for its explanatory 
coherence and intuitive appeal.  Paley’s image of the watch on the heath was certainly 
not the earliest formulation of the design argument, nor even of the watch analogy, 
but its familiarity makes it a suitable starting point.  The argument Paley presented in 
Natural theology can be summarized as follows: if one encounters a watch, the 
complexity of this artifact and the interrelations of its parts lead to the inference that it 
is the product of purposive design.  From this Paley concluded that complexity in 
nature is also the product of a Designer, because proposing that it could have been 
brought about by chance would be absurd (Paley [1802] 2006, 7-15).  
This argument has interesting epistemic properties: it is both an analogy and 
an inference to the best explanation.  Analogies map the structure of a well-known 
domain (the source domain) onto a lesser-known problem (the target domain).  In 
distant analogies the structures of source and target domains greatly differ in their 
basic ontological properties.  The design argument is a distant analogy in that it maps 
the artifactual domain (source domain) onto the natural world (target domain).  
Artifacts exhibit goal-directedness in their design: they are intentionally created by 
designers who had their function in mind.  As organisms exhibit goal-directness in 
their design, they must also be the product of a purposeful designer.  Although this 
analogical structure has often been attacked on the ground that it is inconclusive (e.g. 
Hume 1779, Frank 2004), it is worth noting that distant analogies are well-established 
in scientific practice as a way to gain insight into new problems.  When the 
conceptual structure of the target domain is relatively unknown, as in the case of 
scientific discovery, scientists often resort to analogical reasoning of this sort as an 
epistemic action.  Historical examples include Kepler’s mapping of the properties of 
gravity onto the properties of light (i.e., the fact that sunlight dissipates with 
increasing distance between the Sun and the planets it is cast upon) to explain why 
planets further from the Sun move more slowly, in this case, caused by a weakening 
of the gravitational force with increasing distance from the Sun (Gentner et al. 1997), 
and Darwin’s analogy of a hundred thousand wedges to examine the force of natural 
selection (Millman and Smith 1997).  A more recent example is the Swiss army knife 
analogy as a way to conceptualize the evolved structure of the human brain in 
evolutionary psychology (Cosmides and Tooby 1995, 88).  The analogical structure of 
the design argument is thus epistemic; it is performed to gain insight into an 
unfamiliar domain (God’s creation).  In many early versions, the design argument 
served a heuristic, rather than a strictly argumentative purpose, as in the works of 17th 
century natural philosophers like Bernard Nieuwentijt and Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, 
who perceived design as a source of wonderment about nature.   
Traditionally, design arguments had an inductive argumentative structure.  
They began with the empirical observation that all complex, functional objects of 
known origin were products of intelligent design.  Then came the inductive step, in 
which one infers that what is true for some members of a class is true for all members.  
Hume (1779, part II, 56-60) dispensed with this way of reasoning by arguing that 
artifacts and biological organisms are too dissimilar to be classed together.  When we 
see a house, we can reasonably infer that it has an architect or builder, because we 
know from experience that this particular effect flows from that particular cause.  But 
we have no guarantee that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house as to 
invoke a Designer; we do not know in how far our analogy is reliable.  Indeed, 
because an object resembles other objects in that it has property P does not imply that 
it also resembles them in other respects.  To suppose that it does is affirming the 
consequent, which is a logical mistake. Although Paley did not mention Hume 
explicitly, the structure of his watchmaker analogy escaped this criticism by adopting 
a different strategy.  It is an inference to the best explanation (IBE), which has the 
following structure:  
 
IBE Given evidence E and a pool of plausible, potential explanations H1, …, 
Hn of E, if Hi  explains E better than any of the other hypotheses, infer that Hi 
is closer to the truth than any of these others (Douven 2002, 359).  
 
IBE enables us to probabilistically infer that a given hypothesis is closer to the truth 
than other hypotheses because it explains the available evidence better than rival 
explanations. In this probabilistic aspect, the design argument differs from deductive 
proofs for the existence of God, such as Anselm’s ontological proof.  IBE escapes 
Hume’s critique, because it does not rely on induction, as it simply argues that there is 
no better explanation for order and complexity than design (Gliboff 2000). This 
fundamental probabilistic aspect of the design argument has received relatively little 
attention in the philosophical literature (but see Sober 2002).  Having established 
apparent design and probabilistic inference as two key properties of the design 
argument, we will now examine the possible cognitive bases for its rational 
acceptability. 
 
 
 
3 How we infer design 
3.1 The design stance 
To Paley, the conclusion that a watch is purposefully designed was self-evident.  Our 
perception of its interrelated parts, formed and adjusted to each other—the coiled 
elastic spring, the flexible chains, the cogwheels—each fashioned out of the material 
that suits their intended function best, should lead us to infer that the watch must have 
had a maker who formed it for a specific purpose.  Yet Paley acknowledged that such 
seemingly spontaneous inferences require contextual knowledge about the artifact 
under consideration: ‘it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps 
some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it’ (Paley [1802] 
2006, 8).  In the case of the watch, Paley could infer the intent of the designer, as he 
was familiar with the class of artifacts to which the watch belongs.  But what would 
happen if he pitched his foot against an unfamiliar object, such as an iPod?  Would he 
have inferred design as automatically as in the case of the watch?  Its sleek shape, 
carefully integrated buttons and intended function would have presented a puzzle to 
him.  Unfamiliar artifacts can be so outlandish that people can be led to believe that 
they are not the work of human designers.  During World War II, when the 
indigenous inhabitants of Papua New Guinea were first confronted with western 
goods from the American army, they believed that these were gifts of the ancestors. 
This led to the emergence of cargo cults, whose adherents are still trying to ritually 
lure airplanes into dropping more cargo, more western goods (Frank 2004).  And what 
to think of people who observe UFOs?  Often these alleged spaceships are no more 
than military reconnaissance airplanes, crashing weather balloons, or even bright 
planets. Nevertheless, people do infer that the objects are intentionally designed by 
supernatural agents and by extraterrestrials respectively.  To gain a better 
understanding of the design argument, it is therefore useful to examine how humans 
infer design, what constitutes necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be 
a product of design, and how creator and artifact are causally linked. 
Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that design is not a feature 
we can objectively infer.  Remarkably, neither complexity nor order are necessary and 
sufficient conditions to decide whether an object is purposefully created.  For 
example, Gelman and Ebeling (1998) showed two-year-olds a stain vaguely 
resembling a bear.  They told some subjects that the spot was created accidentally, by 
kicking over a bottle of paint, whereas another group learned that the shape was 
painted intentionally.  Only the children in the latter group called it ‘a bear’.  Thus the 
perception of the stain as representational or accidental depends critically on the prior 
information the children received on how it was brought about. In a similar 
experiment (Gelman and Bloom 2000), adults saw a variety of artifacts, but were 
given two diverging accounts of how the objects came into being.  In the 
unintentional version a piece of cloth was accidentally caught in a machine, resulting 
in holes being punched at regular intervals.  In the intentional version, a person took 
scissors and carefully cut holes at regular intervals.  Subjects were more prone to call 
the object a ‘belt’ if they believed it was intentionally created.  Apparently, design is 
in the eye of the beholder: our judgment that something is an artifact depends on our 
foreknowledge that the artifact was intentionally created.  Once we are familiar with 
specific classes of artifacts, we can reasonably infer that a particular member of a 
class was created with the intention of belonging to this class.  When we see a chair in 
a pile of rubbish, we conclude that the object was created to fulfill a specific function 
(to sit on) and to be of a specific class (chairs).  This stance also provides useful 
inferences when we have to identify classes of non-utilitarian objects, such as ships in 
bottles: although these boats will never sail, we still call them ships, because the 
designer intended them to belong to this class of objects.  The intimate relationship 
between design and intention was noted by Dennett (1987, 16–17) and Bloom (1996) 
who argue that humans take an intuitive design stance: we use the designer’s intention 
to infer the class the object belongs to.  It was on this inference that Paley relied in his 
assertion that the watch was a product of intentional design.  
Conversely, knowledge of the designer’s intention can help us to infer an 
object’s intended function or identity.  Take as an example Bloom and Markson’s 
(1998) experiments in which three- and four-year-olds were shown featureless ovals 
that were purportedly drawn by a child with a broken arm that because of this could 
not draw well. The young subjects were told that these were drawings of chickens 
(three vertical ovals) and a pig (one horizontal oval). When prompted, the 
preschoolers effortlessly identified the pig, because they reasonably inferred that the 
artist would draw objects from the same category in the same way.  Young children 
intuitively regard the creator of an artifact as having privileged knowledge about both 
its name and its intended function.  This was illustrated by an experiment (Jaswal 
2006) in which preschoolers saw objects that were given an anomalous label, e.g., the 
experimenter shows the child a key-shaped object and says ‘you are not going to 
believe this, but this is actually a spoon’.  Children were only willing to adopt the 
anomalous name if the experimenter referred to the object as something he created, 
not as something he merely found. Recognizing that the creator of an artifact has the 
prerogative to name it marks an important step in the development of the design 
stance. 
The intended function and identity of an object thus inextricably link the 
creator with the created object.  This aspect of the design stance is particularly 
interesting in the case of broken objects: although broken watches and fragile chairs 
cannot perform their intended function, we still name these objects watches and chairs 
because they were originally created to fulfill the intended function of their artifact 
class.  When 9-year-olds and adults are presented with broken artifacts, they still label 
them according to their intended function, except if the transformation has changed 
the object beyond recognition (Gutheil et al. 2004).  Paley voiced this intuition aptly 
when he stated: ‘…neither […] would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch 
sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right.  The purpose of the 
machinery, the design, and the designer, might be evident, and in the case supposed 
would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the 
movement, or whether we could account for it or not. […] If by the loss, or disorder, 
or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be 
stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility 
or intention of these parts’ (Paley [1802] 2006, 8–9). 
The human propensity of inferring design may be due to the distinct 
evolutionary history of our species.  Humans rely to a unique extent on tools for their 
survival.  Whereas other primates use mostly unmodified objects as tools, 
archaeological evidence for stone-knapping in hominids goes back as far as 2.7 
million years (Semaw 2000).  By adopting the design stance, hominid children might 
have learned to use and fashion tools more efficiently.  Indeed, comparative studies of 
social learning in children and chimpanzees reveal stark contrasts in the way new 
tools are used: whereas children take the intention of the person who demonstrates 
these tools as guidance, chimpanzees rely more extensively on the physical properties 
of the tools to figure out how they work (Horner and Whiten 2005).  The design 
stance provides children with a useful heuristic to learn about their environment.  It 
allows them to ‘ignore the actual (possibly messy) details of the physical constitution 
of an object, and [relying on] the assumption that it has a certain design, predict that it 
will behave as it is designed to behave under various circumstances’ (Dennett 1987, 
16–17).  Without the design stance, we would not possibly learn to use and name 
hundreds of tools and other artifacts, but would perhaps be limited to the less than ten 
tool types a typical community of wild chimpanzees entertains (Whiten et al., 1999).  
The hypothesis that the design stance is a product of natural selection, rather than the 
cultural product of Aristotelian teleology, finds support in the fact that it also occurs 
in nonwestern cultures, even those where material culture is relatively sparse, like the 
Shuar, an Andean Native American culture (German and Barrett 2005), and that 
infants and young toddlers rely on it to learn the names of novel objects and how to 
use them (Casler and Kelemen 2007). 
 
3.2 Intuitive teleology 
Whereas the design stance might have evolved for the purpose of rapidly categorizing 
and using artifacts, humans also possess a natural propensity for teleological 
reasoning. This propensity is most marked for biological entities, but it can apply to 
almost all categories of objects. Across cultures (see e.g., Barrett 2004), humans have 
the intuition that animals and plants possess adaptations that are self-beneficial, such 
as claws for defense or thorns for protection against being eaten.  Young children, 
however, not only attribute purpose to artifacts and biological adaptations, but also to 
entire organisms (what are lions for? ‘to go in the zoo’) and nonliving natural kinds 
like clouds (‘for raining’)—a tendency termed ‘promiscuous teleology’ (Kelemen 
2004).  Moreover, when given a choice between teleological and non-teleological 
explanations, preschoolers and elementary school children prefer teleological 
accounts.  For example, when asked whether rocks are pointy because of natural 
processes (e.g., ‘bits of stuff piled up for a long period of time’) or because of 
teleological functions (e.g., ‘so that animals could scratch on them when they got 
itchy’), children typically endorse the latter (Kelemen 2003).  At around ten to twelve 
years of age, the preference for teleological explanations lessens, probably because 
adolescents acquire elaborate coherent mechanistic explanations through schooling.  
Although mountains can be climbed, few adults would claim that mountains are there 
to climb on.  This is because our learned knowledge that mountains are formed by 
tectonic activity or volcanism is incompatible with teleological explanations, where 
the function provides a sufficient reason for why the structure exists.  Remarkably, 
patients with Alzheimer’s disease show a re-emerging preference for teleological 
explanations.  For example, they think that rain is there so that plants and animals 
could have water to drink and grow, rather than the acquired explanation that rain 
occurs by water condensing into clouds and forming droplets (Lombrozo et al. 2007).  
An increased tendency to teleology is also observed in people with little schooling 
such as Roma adults (Gypsies from central European descent).  Formal education 
seems to reduce a preference for teleological explanations, but cannot eradicate them.  
Indeed, when educated adults are forced to make speeded judgments, they too, show a 
heightened acceptance of teleological explanations: when judging at a glance whether 
a statement is correct or not, they tend to endorse teleological, incorrect explanations, 
such as ‘the Sun radiates heat because warmth nurtures life’ (Kelemen and Rosset in 
press).  Reasoning strategies observed in children persist into adulthood, but may be 
masked by secondary explanatory strategies.  Once these become impaired (in the 
case of Alzheimer patients) or are unavailable (in the case of speeded judgments or 
lack of education), the intuitive, evolved strategies of childhood re-emerge.  Although 
scientific education tends to lessen teleological reasoning, the tendency to apply 
teleology is not absent even among trained scientists.  An analysis of the 
paleoanthropological literature (the study of human evolution) reveals that early 
theorists relied on extra-scientific intuitive explanatory strategies—until the late 
1970s many paleoanthropologists thought that separate lineages of human races 
evolved toward an idealized endpoint (modern humans), a process denoted as 
orthogenesis, which is now uniformly rejected (De Cruz and De Smedt 2007).  
Today, teleology is no longer considered a valid scientific principle in biology. 
It is hard to refrain from thinking that the eye’s function is ‘for seeing,’ whereas it is 
more in tune with evolutionary theory to say that the eye’s function can be described 
in terms of the effects it had for reproduction and survival in past organisms in which 
this structure evolved. Nevertheless, teleology is a useful heuristic to make sense of 
our everyday artifactual and biological environment—it enables us at a glance to see 
what a tool is for (e.g., a sharp edge for cutting) or to categorize animals as dangerous 
or not (e.g., presence of claws or fangs).  As Kant had already argued in his Critique 
of Judgment, we use teleological explanations because the concept of purpose makes 
living things and artifacts more intelligible to us (Kant [1790] 1987, part II, § 66).  
The central place of teleology in human cognition can perhaps explain why it remains 
an important philosophical and theological principle, despite its lack of scientific 
plausibility. Note that the fact that our psychological propensities are sometimes at 
odds with scientific knowledge does not necessarily affect the rationality of our 
judgments.  Not only are they often indispensable in everyday reasoning (our 
understanding of artifacts would be seriously compromised without the design 
stance), concepts like ‘design’ or ‘purpose’ would be meaningless without them. 
Whether or not such concepts are also scientifically meaningful, is a property that is to 
be empirically discovered. 
 
 
3.3 Are humans intuitive theists? 
Does the tendency to infer design also entail an inference to a Designer, as Paley and 
others have suggested?  At this point, developmental and experimental psychological 
data do not present a unified picture.  Lombrozo et al. (2007) found that although 
Alzheimer patients reasoned more teleologically, they were not more likely than 
healthy control subjects to invoke God as an explanation.  In a study that probed 
Dutch primary school children’s intuitive theories on the origin of species 
(Samarapungavan and Wiers 1997), the answers clustered together in different 
categories, including spontaneous generation, Lamarckism and pure essentialism (i.e., 
animals and plants have always existed).  Although many children made teleological 
inferences, only about 10% made explicit reference to God or intelligent design.  On 
the other hand, a comparable experiment by Evans (2001) in the United States, found 
that the majority of 10-year-olds endorsed creationist accounts of the origin of 
species, regardless of their religious background. Kelemen and diYanni (2005) 
obtained comparable results with British elementary school children, although the 
percentage of creationist accounts was significantly lower than with American 
subjects.  
Several possible explanations might account for these findings.  A strong 
position holds that humans are intuitive theists.  In this view, creationism is a natural 
mode of reasoning which is only altered when children acquire explicitly non-
religious beliefs from their cultural environment.  Bering (2006) defends this position, 
arguing that religious beliefs are biological adaptations that were directly selected to 
enhance cooperation, altruism and group cohesion.  A weaker position (e.g., Bloom 
2007) holds that religious belief itself is not innate but a byproduct of other cognitive 
adaptations such as agency detection and theory of mind.  In this view, children 
acquire culturally transmitted religious beliefs easily because these key in on evolved 
propensities of the human mind.  Here the step from design to Designer is not 
automatically made, but needs to be made explicit, as Paley and others in fact did.  
Support for this latter view comes from experiments where Hindu (Barrett 1998) and 
Christian (Barrett & Keil 1996) college students had to recall stories about God.  In 
doing so, they unconsciously distorted the stories to fit God into intuitive expectations 
they had about normal people, such as only attending to one person or one event at the 
same time.  This indicates that representing an omniscient, omnipresent being is 
cognitively demanding and that expectations about normal agents structure reasoning 
about divine agents.  Another view, suggested by Taede Smedes as he read this paper, 
holds that intuitive theism might be an evolved module, but that it depends on 
external cultural circumstances for its development, in the same way as the language 
faculty requires appropriate linguistic input to develop properly.  It is our belief that 
the experimental evidence does not support the view that there is an intuitive theism.  
What is still required is an assignment of a probability to the existence of a Designer.  
In the next section, we will look in more detail at the probabilistic aspects of the 
design argument. 
 
4 Intuitive probability: Can chance events produce order and complexity? 
4.1 The Annales and the Boeing   
Butler (1736) already observed that all human reasoning is probabilistic: as we are 
finite beings with knowledge that is restricted in time and space, we cannot claim 
absolute knowledge. From imperfect observations, we regularly draw far-reaching 
conclusions. Humans are naturally endowed with the ability to detect statistical 
frequencies in their environment (for a comprehensive overview, see De Cruz in 
press).  This ability is not restricted to humans; it occurs in a wide variety of animal 
species, including those with relatively simple nervous systems like bumblebees (Real 
1991).  Human infants use probability inference to learn about their environment, 
such as the statistical detection of recurring sound patterns to chunk streams of 
continuous speech into words, which is crucial for word learning (Aslin et al. 1998).  
The design argument draws on our evolved ability to assess posterior probability, i.e. 
the probability that is assigned after the relevant evidence is taken into account.  From 
the age of five onward, humans are fairly accurate in making such assessments (e.g., 
Girotto and Gonzales 2008). For example, if preschoolers are shown that more red 
than green chips are placed in a bag, they will correctly state that there is a higher 
chance that the experimenter will draw a red chip. However, if the experimenter says 
‘I can feel that the chip in my hand is round’ and proportionally more round chips are 
green, children will update their probabilistic judgments in favor of green. 
How likely is it that the apparent design in nature was intentionally created or, 
alternatively, that it happened by chance?  Early proponents of the design argument 
have taken their intuition that chance does not produce order as a starting point: ‘He 
who believes this may as well believe that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty 
letters […] were thrown upon the ground, they would fall into such order as to legibly 
form the Annales of Ennius.  I doubt whether fortune could make a single verse of 
them.  How, therefore, can these people assert that the world was made by the 
fortuitous concourse of atoms […]’ (Cicero 45 BC, book 2, § XXXVII). Cicero 
discarded the atomists’ idea that chance collisions of elementary building blocks 
(atoms) formed the material world on the basis that chance has a low probability of 
producing order.  Assuming that the 21 letters of the Roman alphabet are equally 
distributed into his ‘great quantity’, the chance of the first letter falling in the correct 
place is 1/21, the chance that the first two letters are correct is thus 1/21× 1/21 = 
1/441 (if the space is also treated as a letter, it would be 1/22 × 1/22 = 1/484). The 
chance that the letters would produce the approximately 7000 characters of the 600 
lines that survive of Ennius’ Annales (a now fragmentary epic poem on the history of 
Rome) is vanishingly small, being 1/217000.  Cicero’s intuition has been re-iterated by 
countless other writers, including astronomer Fred Hoyle’s image of hurling around 
scrap metal at random and happening to assemble a Boeing 747.  Although all 
arrangements of the scrap metal are, with hindsight, equally improbable, very few of 
them will fly; similarly, although all combinations of 21 letters are equally unique, 
very few of them will produce a legible text, let alone the Annales.  Dembski (1998) 
has developed this inference as the basis for his defense of Intelligent Design.  
Although it is intuitively compelling, rejecting chance as an explanation for 
complexity and design is problematic because, as Sober (2002) notes, there is no 
probabilistic equivalent of modus tollens, in other words we cannot state that 
 
If hypothesis H were true, observation O would be highly improbable 
But O 
Therefore, H is not true 
 
The lottery paradox aptly illustrates this: assume a fair lottery in which only 1 of 1000 
tickets is the winner, therefore the probability of winning the lottery is very low.  Yet 
winning the lottery does not cast doubt on its fairness.  The law of likelihood in 
statistics stipulates that it is not the absolute value of the probability of data under a 
single hypothesis that is to be considered, but rather how the probability values 
compare under different hypotheses.  The intuitive idea that improbability strengthens 
the existence of God is problematic in that it tacitly relies on an analogy between 
human and divine agency.  In the case where we have to decide whether human 
design or chance is responsible, we rely on empirical knowledge of what human 
agents in fact do.  In an example from Himma (2005), adapted from Dembksi (1998), 
suppose a political candidate’s name appears first on the lists of voting ballots 40 out 
of 41 times.  The probability of such an event occurring by chance is very small.  But 
when we decide that a county clerk rigged the list, we rely on two pieces of tacit 
knowledge, namely that undecided voters are more likely to choose the first on the 
list, and that the county clerk wants a particular party to win.  Being an intelligent 
agent, it is not unlikely that he rigged the list.  We also know of cases where voting 
ballots were tampered with to win an election.  Hence the hypothesis that the name 
was placed first 40 out of 41 times by design, rather than mere chance becomes very 
plausible indeed.  But in the case of divine action, we do not have empirical 
knowledge to draw upon, thus no prior assumptions can be drawn about what God 
would or would not do.  It is hence not possible to accord prior probabilities to the 
existence of God on the basis of empirical evidence. Without the necessary 
background data to make the design argument an IBE, this argument tacitly relies on 
an analogy between human and divine agency. Again, this version of the design 
argument becomes an argument from analogy—as we saw in section 2, this was 
successfully attacked by Hume, and it was precisely for this reason that Paley had 
recast the argument from design into an IBE. 
 
4.2 Probability and inference to the best explanation 
The reliability of IBE as an abductive strategy depends on the amount and quality of 
the data and the relevance of the data to the conclusion.  If insufficient evidence is 
available, IBE may well lead us to choose ‘the best of a bad lot’ (van Fraassen, 1989, 
143).  In fact, the bad lot argument even applies if one has all the possible evidence as 
one may simply have failed to conceive of the true theory with this evidence in hand.  
If each letter that falls correctly is selectively retained, we need at most 21×7000 trials 
to complete what is now left of the Annales.  Cicero, being unacquainted with the 
principle of cumulative selective retention, did not envision this possibility.  Dawkins 
([1986] 1991, 46-48) uses a similar analogy to illustrate this point: whereas one 
monkey could not possibly type a sentence from Hamlet, selective retention of 
keystrokes by many typing monkeys would solve the problem.  Unfortunately, when 
using an IBE strategy, most modern versions of the design argument do not take 
natural selection and its principle of cumulative selective retention into account as a 
viable explanation.  Dembski (1998), for example, holds that regularity, chance and 
design exhaust the possibilities, thereby sidestepping the combination of chance and 
regularity that is natural selection.  To be sure, in 1802 natural selection was not in the 
pool of possible explanations.  However, as Gliboff (2000) demonstrates, Paley did 
have a range of alternative materialist explanations, of which we will mention three.  
First, necessity: as everything has to have some form, it may as well be the present 
form, e.g., the eye is the actual realization of the possible ways to fill an eye socket.  
Second, he considered infinite trial and error: given an infinite time and universe, 
every possible configuration of matter could be produced, some of which turned out 
to be viable life-forms that persisted and reproduced, an interesting precursor to the 
concept of natural selection.  Third, he discussed the claim that parts of organisms 
could arise before their function was determined, an exaptation theory avant la lettre 
(Paley [1802] 2006, p. 38-41). 
These alternatives were being explored and hotly debated in Paley’s time by 
early evolutionists like Buffon, Diderot and d’Holbach; Paley seems familiar with 
these authors as he mentioned Buffon explicitly and others implicitly.  Next to these, 
he briefly discussed the special biological forces or organizing principles proposed by 
the Göttingen school of German biologists, such as Blumenbach, Kielmeyer and Reil 
(Paley [1802](2006), 218-225).  Although rejected now, their Newtonian approach to 
biology in which they stipulated forces acting on biological entities (analogous to 
physical forces acting on physical entities) was conceivable and widely accepted at 
the time.  The idea proposed by atomists like Democritos and Lucretius that very 
improbable things may happen in an infinite universe has its modern statistical 
formulation in Diaconis and Mosteller (1989, 859), in that ‘with a large enough 
sample, any outrageous thing is likely to happen.’  What led Paley to reject these 
alternatives?  His answer was that the purported natural propensities required 
intelligent design:  ‘I am unwilling to give to it the name of an atheistic scheme […] 
because, so far as I am able to understand it, the original propensities and the 
numberless varieties of them […] are, in the plan itself, attributed to the ordination 
and appointment of an intelligent and designing Creator (Paley [1802] 2006, 224-
225).’  One could dismiss this as a circular argument in that he rejected naturalistic 
explanations because they point to a Designer, the proposition that had to be proven.  
We want to argue that it can likewise be seen as arising out of the high probability 
Paley accorded to the existence of God—as we will argue in the next section, the 
likelihood of data can only be meaningfully assessed in relationship with hypotheses, 
which are accorded a prior probability.  
 
5 A rational basis for disagreement 
If humans are prone to discern design and teleology in nature, why then do 
some find the design argument more compelling than others? This may be due not to 
intrinsic differences in the way design and teleology are discerned, but to differences 
in the prior probability people place on the existence of a Designer.  An interesting 
way to approach this problem is through an examination of how humans regard 
coincidences.  In Griffiths’ and Tenenbaum’s view (2007), an event is a coincidence 
if it is judged to have a lower probability of occurring under our current theory of how 
the world works than under an alternative hypothesis.  Coincidences play an 
important epistemic role in scientific discovery: the meteorologist Alfred Wegener 
noted that the coastlines of West-Africa and South-America fitted into each other like 
a jigsaw, that their geological strata matched, and that the distribution of species on 
both sides of the Atlantic was highly correlated.  He thought that this pattern was not 
a mere coincidence, but that these continents were once joined and had drifted apart.  
Similarly, in the 19th century, the physician John Snow noted that cholera outbreaks in 
London tended to cluster at public water pumps and inferred that this was not a 
coincidence, but provided evidence for his new theory that cholera was transmitted 
through polluted water (rather than bad air, the then favored theory).  These examples 
suggest an intimate connection between coincidence and evidence.  A mere 
coincidence occurs when the likelihood ratio in favor of an alternative theory is 
insufficient to overwhelm the prior odds against it.  A coincidence becomes evidence 
when the likelihood ratio in favor of an alternative theory overcomes the prior odds 
against it, and leads us to accept that alternative theory.  Because people differ in the 
prior probabilities they assign to alternative hypotheses, what is a coincidence to one 
person can be considered compelling evidence by another.   
In the case of the design argument, the competing hypotheses are Hmat 
(purposive and complex structures arose strictly through natural, material causes) and 
Hdeo (design as the result of a Designer).  In the framework of Hmat, the occurrence of 
ordered complexity and apparent design presents a coincidence.  Given that chance 
events tend to produce disorder, their probability is extremely low.  Darwin’s theory 
of natural selection has successfully solved this dilemma, because it relies on a 
combination of chance and law-like processes.  Indeed, there is no other naturalistic 
theory that can explain why living things are improbably complex, why the 
interrelationships between their parts are highly functional and why they exhibit 
features that enhance their probability of surviving and reproducing in their 
environment.  Proponents of Hmat can find epistemic justification in Darwin’s 
explanation of design.  To justify why they favor their view rather than Hdeo, they can 
cite examples of maladaptedness, and appeal to ontological parsimony as their 
explanation is restricted to observable, causal physical processes.  In Hdeo the 
occurrence of design is not improbable, as this theory explicitly proposes a Designer 
who made the universe orderly and purposeful.  Under these epistemic circumstances, 
but not under Hmat, design in nature becomes corroborative evidence for the existence 
of a Creator.  Next to this, natural theologians can also appeal to ontological 
parsimony, since it reduces many kinds of explanation to one under Hdeo (e.g., 
Swinburne 1968).   
This model of prior probabilities can explain three puzzling facts.  First, it 
explains why evolutionary thinkers writing before 1859 did not accept natural 
theology’s design argument.  Even in Paley’s time, not everyone was led to accept 
Hdeo although the arguments in favor of natural theology were widespread.  Early 
evolutionists like Erasmus Darwin and biologists of the Göttingen school sought to 
describe biological forces that could assemble complexity in the same way as Newton 
had done for mechanics.  These authors had a strong commitment to a physicalist 
worldview leading them to adopt the view that Hdeo was unlikely, even though they 
did not have a compelling causal explanation for the apparent design.  Second, it can 
explain why the design argument, despite its intuitive appeal, fails to convince non-
believers.  As long as plausible naturalistic explanations for design in nature are 
available, the design argument will fail to overturn their prior beliefs.  Third, it may 
elucidate why well-established scientific data do not convince believers of design of 
the opposite.  This is shown paradigmatically in the USA, where everyone has access 
to scientific education, yet creationism/Intelligent Design is widespread, and people 
have a severe distrust of evolutionary theory (see Miller et al. 2006).  The epistemic 
force of the prior probabilities we accord to competing hypotheses is an important 
element in scientific and other formalized ways of reasoning.  It can explain, for 
example, why scientists are unwilling to let go of a cherished theory even in spite of 
overwhelming evidence against it, as already described by Kuhn (1962).  For theists, 
design in nature provides compelling circumstantial evidence for the existence of a 
Creator.  Take as an illustration the Thomistic tradition, which emphasizes the role of 
understanding and knowledge (scientia) in belief.  In this view, a successful natural 
theology would start out from self-evident premises, proceed by valid arguments and 
reach the conclusion that there is a person such as God (Plantinga 1991).  As we have 
seen in section 3, humans are prone to discern design and teleology in nature.  Within 
the epistemic context of Hdeo, the perceived design in nature that is a universal feature 
of human cognition can be taken as a self-evident premise from which the existence 
of a Creator can be argued.  It is however, not a standalone argument that can 
convince those who do not believe in God (see also Himma 2005), especially since 
plausible naturalistic explanations have become available.  
  
6 Is there still a place for the design argument? 
Undeniably, the power of the design argument as an inference to the best explanation 
has been seriously weakened since Darwin and Wallace independently came up with 
natural selection as a naturalistic explanation for design.  Given that the combination 
of random events and selective retention can explain most of the apparent design 
around us, can theologians still reasonably invoke design?  Misrepresenting or 
altogether neglecting natural selection is the strategy most commonly adopted by 
proponents of Intelligent Design.  Intelligent Design, however, is not a very desirable 
position for theologians to take because it makes scientific claims that need to be 
evaluated by scientific standards.  As a scientific research program, it fails because its 
hypothesis of a Designer is too vague and too general to count as a scientific 
hypothesis; it cannot be used as a basis for empirical testing.  Even concepts like 
irreducible complexity are too broad and too vacuous to be investigated by 
biologists—to date, there are no satisfying models of complexity that allows for 
investigation by empirical, quantitative methods.  Moreover, using scientific standards 
to argue for divine action is a category mistake, since God is not an immanent cause 
like other natural causes (Smedes 2008).  The most productive way for theologians 
and scientists to look at the argument from design is therefore to treat it as a 
metaphysical, rather than a scientific principle.  Within this perspective, we think 
there are at least two cases in which a design position is still defensible.  
A first case is presented by a position that endorses evolutionary biology but 
argues that God intervenes occasionally to fashion structures that could not have 
arisen through natural selection. In this position, one endorses intelligent design as a 
philosophical position but not Intelligent Design as a scientific research program, 
which conceptualizes evolution and design as two competing scientific explanations.  
Theologically, it follows a distinction that is commonly made between God’s general 
actions (which pertain to the universe as a whole, and can be seen in the laws that 
govern physical, chemical and biological processes) and special actions (which 
include actions that lie beyond the normal physical processes).  Whereas natural 
selection and other evolutionary processes belong to the former category, occasional 
design or intervention in these belongs to the latter.  Johnson and Potter (2005), for 
example, argue that human natural language might be the product of purposive 
creation.  They base their argument on the fact that adaptationist explanations require 
a plausible reason why the adaptation evolved.  Adaptations evolve in response to 
specific selective pressures; they enhance the survival and reproduction of their 
bearers.  For language, there are as yet no convincing adaptationist explanations: 
currently we do not know what language is an adaptation for, nor how and when it 
evolved.  Despite the proliferation of adaptationist stories on the origin of language, 
such as social grooming, technological intelligence, cooperative hunting and sexual 
selection, none of these hypotheses has been able to substantiate itself into a theory.  
This leads Johnson and Potter (2005) to infer to the best explanation that purposive 
design brought language into being.  Note that this position is distinct from Intelligent 
Design in that they explicitly endorse evolutionary theory as the best explanation for 
complexity in the living world.  
A second, perhaps stronger case (because it does not rely on a God of the 
gaps) is found in scientists and theologians who regard design and evolution as 
complementary rather than as mutually exclusive explanatory frameworks.  
Watchmakers do not build watches from scratch; rather, they rely on the gradually 
accumulated innovations in time-keeping technology, which we can trace back from 
sundials and water-clocks, over the introduction of the spring to the modern digital 
watch.  Upon close scrutiny, very few inventions appear de novo; most are the result 
of a gradual and cumulative retention of favorable variations (Basalla 1988).  For 
example, the streamlined design of Polynesian canoes which is close to optimum can 
be traced through archaeological and historical data as the gradual and unconscious 
retention of favorable variations, with the perilous ocean as the selecting agent 
(Rogers and Ehrlich 2008).  These insights on the origin of artifacts can be extended 
to divine design.  The 19th-century botanist Asa Gray defended the view that natural 
selection is an ‘a-fortiori extension to the supposed case of a watch which sometimes 
produces better watches, and contrivances adapted to successive conditions, and so at 
length turns out a chronometer, a town clock, or a series of organisms of the same 
type’ (Gray 1888, 57).  To take a recent example of this position, cell biologist 
Kenneth Miller ([1999] 2007) argues that God has initiated natural selection and other 
natural evolutionary processes as an indirect way to create complexity and design.  
For Miller ([1999] 2007, 213, 238, 253), the undetermined nature of evolution 
through natural selection and other natural processes enabled the evolution of truly 
free, truly independent beings.  Similarly, Theodosius Dobzhansky, one of the 
founding fathers of the modern synthesis, wrote that ‘[t]he organic diversity becomes 
[…] reasonable and understandable if the Creator has created the living world not by 
caprice but by evolution propelled by natural selection […] Evolution is God’s or 
Nature’s, method of Creation’ (Dobzhansky 1973, 127). This position is stronger than 
Intelligent Design, because proponents of the latter—who see natural and supernatural 
causes as competing explanations for complexity in the living world—in many cases 
need to acknowledge that natural selection is the better explanation.  This problem is 
avoided when one allows for the possibility that evolution and design are not mutually 
exclusive. 
On the basis of modern evolutionary theory it is not possible to reject either 
Hmat or Hdeo. Both positions depend on prior probabilities that are not assigned on the 
basis of scientific evidence but on the basis of metaphysical principles. It is interesting 
to note that both positions—physicalism and naturalistic theism—already existed in 
the earliest stages of evolutionary theory.  Whereas Charles Darwin and Thomas 
Huxley did not admit room for God in their explanatory frameworks, Alfred Wallace 
and Asa Gray were theists, who treated divine action as complementary with a 
scientific worldview, not as a competitor. Wallace, for example, while continuing to 
endorse natural selection as the chief principle guiding the evolution of plants and 
animals, invoked intelligent design for the human mind: ‘[t]he brain of pre-historic 
and of savage man seems to me to prove the existence of some power, distinct from 
that which has guided the development of the lower animals through their ever-
varying forms of being’ (Wallace, 1871, 343).  Fichman (2001) aptly argues that 
Wallace’s theism, rather than a volte-face, was an integral part of his evolutionary 
thinking. Today, both schools of thought continue to exist side by side, with Richard 
Dawkins and Daniel Dennett as examples of strict materialists and Kenneth R. Miller 
and Simon Conway Morris as proponents of theistic evolution. 
In this paper, we have argued that the argumentative structure of the design 
argument can be traced back to evolved biases of the human brain.  It relies on the 
design stance, which leads us to treat complex and purposive structures as the product 
of design, and on intuitive teleology, the propensity of humans to discern purpose in 
nature.  These cognitive biases are universal, although they can be masked by formal 
education or strengthened by religious upbringing.  The step from design to Designer 
is perhaps more explicit, and relies on an inference to the best explanation.  The 
plausibility of this inference relies on the prior probability one places on the existence 
of God.  By making these differences in prior probability more explicit, theists 
(natural theologians, biologists and philosophers) and physicalist scientists and 
philosophers have a rational basis for disagreement.  
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